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Abstract: This article examines the determinants of traffic in European ports in 2010 by 
estimating a generalized linear model with a gamma distribution. Controlling for various 
economic and geographic attributes of the regions in which the ports are located, we 
analyze the impact of the competition scenarios that the respective port authorities face. 
We include a range of explanatory factors of port traffic including the share of 
transshipment traffic, the competition within a terminal, the volume of traffic from 
neighboring ports, the level of connectivity with other transportation modes and the port’s 
model of governance. The main findings indicate that a bureaucratic model of governance 
can harm traffic levels, while traffic from neighboring ports and better rail facilities can all 
serve to boost traffic. Finally, we do not find evidence that competition within the port can 
affect traffic positively.  
 
 







In recent years, international maritime transportation has played a critical role in the 
strengthening of the relationship between trade and economic development, with such 
factors as the container revolution and burgeoning trade flows ensuring that ports have 
become a vital element in economic growth. Several empirical studies have examined the 
economic impact of port traffic on the European (Bottasso et al., 2013), Italian (Ferrari et 
al., 2010) and Spanish regions (Fageda and Gonzalez-Aregall, 2015), concluding that port 
throughput has a positive effect on employment. Similarly, Shan et al. (2014) reported a 
positive relationship between per capita GDP and port traffic in China. In addition, Arbués 
et al. (2015) found that seaport investment in Spain can have positive effects spilling over 
into neighboring regions. 
Europe, because of its highly developed economy and large population, is one of the 
world’s main trading regions (Stopford, 2009), as illustrated by the volume of cargo flows 
handled on its trade routes. Thus, the transatlantic route between America and Europe 
shifts a stable traffic of six million full TEUs1 per year and the Asia and Europe route 
moves 20 million full TEUs per year (UNCTAD, 2013). Against this backdrop of 
globalized markets, the world’s ports are subject to increasingly intense competition as they 
seek to attract more traffic from global competitors as well as from local ports in 
overlapping hinterlands (Xiao et al., 2012). A number of studies claim that this increased 
competition is closely related to processes of containerization and port devolution2 (Yuen 
et al, 2012; Zhang, 2008). For example, in the gateway region of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta, 
Notteboom (2009) observed that the region’s largest ports were substitutes for each other 
and that its smaller ports were complements of these large load centers. 
In this paper, we examine the factors that account for the volume of traffic handled by 
Europe’s ports by means of an econometric analysis. Controlling for the economic and 
geographic attributes of the regions in which the ports are located, we analyze the influence 
of the competition scenarios that port authorities face. Indeed, greater competition may 
enhance efficiency (Garcia-Alonso and Martin-Bofarull, 2007; Figueiredo De Oliveira and 
Cariou, 2015), promote a port’s attractiveness (Ng, 2006) and influence investments and 
prices (Van Reeven, 2010, Xiao et al., 2012). In short, a more competitive scenario can 
have the effect of boosting port traffic. In contrast, competition might mean some ports 
                                               
1 TEUs: Twenty-foot Equivalent Units. 
2 The OECD (2008) report explains that containerization allows ports in the same region to become 
substitutes, exposing them to more competition from other ports, and that the devolution of port 
management results in ports adopting a more commercial approach, which intensifies competition. 
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suffer reductions in traffic at the expense of other, more efficient, ports. Thus, traffic may 
well be diverted from small to large ports that are connected to extensive hinterland 
networks (Notteboom, 2010). Additionally, such factors as the level of connectivity with 
surface transportation modes and the degree of inland congestion can shift traffic to more 
efficient ports (Zhang, 2008). 
The primary objective of this article is to determine whether a more competitive 
scenario benefits port traffic in the European Union. The study focuses on total container 
traffic as opposed to total traffic, since in this way we can take into account competition 
not only from the local market but also from other regions. Moreover, the availability of 
data for all port authorities and the homogeneous characteristics of containers allow us to 
compare port traffic records. 
While traffic that ports are able to generate may be strongly affected by the competition 
that they must afford, no previous paper has analyzed the impact of competition on port 
traffic by performing an econometric analysis. Hence, our paper contributes to the 
literature by reporting an analysis of the determinants of European port traffic using a 
multivariate equation. Previous studies have analyzed the impact of a range of specific 
factors on port efficiency. For example, Garcia-Alonso and Martin-Bofarull, (2007) 
examined the effect of improvements in efficiency in attracting more traffic, while 
Figueiredo De Oliveira and Cariou (2015) investigated the impact of inter-port competition 
on efficiency. Furthermore, several studies have analyzed the impact of privatization (eg; 
Cheon et al, 2010; Cullinane et al, 2002; Czerny et al., 2014; Liu, 1995; Tongzon and Heng, 
2005) and reforms towards more autonomy of port authorities (eg; Barros and 
Athanassious, 2004; Estache et al., 2002; González and Trujillo, 2008) on port efficiency.3 
Other studies have examined the effect of competition on port traffic but have tended to 
focus on one port region and to undertake analyses of variance, reveled preference 
indicators or time-series analysis (Castillo-Manzano et al., 2008; Ng, 2006; Notteboom, 
2009).  
This paper uses econometric techniques to estimate a multivariate equation that 
simultaneously considers port attributes, surface transport connectivity and governance 
variables of a large sample of European ports. Although previous studies have evaluated 
Europe’s port system (Notteboom, 2010), none have examined simultaneously the 
                                               
3 González and Trujillo (2009) provide a detailed review of empirical studies about port efficiency.  
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influence of such a broad range of factors on port traffic. We find that competition 
between ports may spur traffic, while competition within a port may not be so effective in 
increasing port traffic. Indeed, we find evidence that a more intense competition between 
ports may boost traffic as suggest the results for the variables that identify the traffic of 
nearby ports and the governance model. Furthermore, we do not find clear evidence that 
competition within the port increases traffic as ports with a terminal managed by a 
shipping line have more traffic. In this regard, we also find that ports with a greater share 
of transshipment traffic have more traffic. Hub ports may be subject to a more intense 
competition from other ports but they tend to be dominated by one shipping line. Finally, 
we also find that those ports connected with rail facilities that can move trains of more 
than 700 meters length are able to generate more traffic. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the main features of the 
European port authorities included in our sample focusing especially on those factors that 
may determine the competition scenario in which they operate; Section 3 describes the 
empirical model used and provides a justification of the explanatory variables selected. 
Section 4 addresses some econometric issues and explains the results of the estimates. 
Finally, the last section is devoted to summarizing the main findings and discussing the 
policy implications. 
 
2. SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN PORTS 
This section provides an exploratory analysis of the factors explaining the intensity of 
port competition among European port authorities considered in our analysis. Our 
database draws on the Containerization Yearbook for 2012. From the World Container 
Port Traffic League (totaling 365 port authorities), we consider 92 European Port 
authorities for which we have data available. Our sample permits us to analyze all the 
largest European port authorities and most medium and small port authorities. This sample 
represents a high percentage of total port traffic in Europe.4 
Thus, we can take advantage of a large cross-section in our empirical analysis. A 
limitation of our data is that they refer to just one year. While extending our sample to 
create a panel would be preferable, we still think that our analysis is valuable. Note that 
several explanatory variables are time invariant. Furthermore, in the context of our analysis, 
                                               
4See table A1 in the Annex for a list of all port authorities contained in our database, with data about traffic 
and governance characteristics. 
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the between variation of the data (variation across ports) should be much more relevant 
than the within variation of the data (variation over time of each port).  
An increase in maritime freight traffic has led to a rise in long-distance containerized 
trade. A difficulty in establishing direct shipping connections induced the emergence of 
intermediate transshipment ports (ITF, 2009). According to Portopia (2012), large hub 
ports are those with more than 2 million TEUs and with a transshipment incidence of 
greater than 50 % of their total TEU throughput.5 Note that one terminal (at least) of these 
large hub ports is usually controlled by a single shipping company.  
Consequently, we observed that these transshipment ports are subject to more 
competition with other ports but not within the port itself. To illustrate, Bremen is a 
transshipment port located in the North of Europe and has a terminal controlled by MSC 
and Maersk. Furthermore, the transshipment port of Marsaxlokk is located in the Island of 
Malta and it has a terminal managed by CMA-CGM. Note here that the aim of this analysis 
is to measure the dominance of pure shipping lines. For example, APM Terminal is a 
subsidiary of Maersk but in our analysis it is considered a Terminal Operator according to 
the classification of Notteboom and Rodrigue (2012).6 
Undoubtedly, this increase in maritime freight traffic has affected local port competition 
and hinterland connections. In this regard, the potential hinterland of a port can be defined 
as the area that can be reached in the least amount of time while incurring the lowest cost 
(Wilmsmeier et al., 2011). While overlapping hinterlands can occur in contiguous port 
market areas (Van Klink and Van den Berg, 1998), this area is essential for port 
competition (Wan et al., 2013) and has an impact on port growth (Zhang, 2008). Thus, 
ports with rail facilities within a terminal may expand their hinterland. Furthermore, Turner 
et al. (2004) provide evidence about the role of the rail industry as a critical determinant of 
port infrastructure productivity. In this regard, port terminals with suitable rail facilities are 
fundamentally located in the North compared to a lack of availability of rail facilitates in 
the Southern ports of Europe.7 Castillo-Manzano et al (2013) found that the poor 
intermodal port-to-rail connections in Spain has damaged the competitiveness of ports. 
                                               
5In our analysis ports with these characteristics are Bremen (Germany), Gioia Tauro (Italy), Algeciras (Spain) 
and Marsaxlokk (Malta). We do not have available data on transshipment traffic for all ports in our sample to 
identify smaller hubs.  
6 According to the authors, almost 75 % of the total European Container throughput in 2008 was handled by 
the top five terminal operators: PSA, APM Terminals, HPH, DP World and Eurogate. 
7 Rotterdam (Netherlands), Antwerp (Belgium), Hamburg (Germany), Bremen (Germany), Zeebrugge 
(Belgium), Le Havre (France), Genoa (Italy), Duisburg (Germany), Marseilles (France), Strasbourg (France), 
Gavle (Sweden), Bristol (UK) and Amsterdam (Netherlands).  
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Similarly, the amount of port traffic that is operated in the same region can affect the 
degree of competition with nearby ports. As can be seen in Figure 1, the three major ports 
move more than 5 million TEUs and are located in Northern Europe. Port authorities in 
the range of 1 to 5 million TEUs are primarily located in Germany, France, UK, Spain and 
Belgium. Finally, the majority of port authorities are smaller, containing less than 0.5 
Million TEUs. From figure 1, it can be concluded that the majority of regions in the 
Southern Europe have smaller, local ports while the most concentrated traffic throughput 
and the largest ports are based in the North of Europe regardless of its size and population.  
 
Figure 1: Traffic in European ports 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Containerization International Yearbook 2012  
 
The complexity and diversity of Europe’s port authorities has had a marked influence 
on competition. Notteboom and Verhoeven (2010) and Notteboom et al. (2012) perceive 
the diversity of the port authorities in terms of the involvement of private operators. 
Likewise, Wang and Cullinane (2006) indicate that different systems of port governance in 
Europe might be a key determinant of container terminal efficiency.8 
The development of the European Union has seen the establishment of a single market 
place typified by economic integration and intense competition.9 However, while the 
                                               
8 Trujillo and Tovar (2007) examined the economic efficiency of the European port industry. 
9 For an analysis of organization and regulation theory and port industry in Europe see Tovar et al. (2004).  
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European Commission has taken steps to set up a common European port policy 
(Verhoeven, 2009), the decision-making process of the port agents has yet to be 
harmonized (Pallis, 2007). 
Since the eighties, almost all port authorities have undergone a process of devolution 
with greater private involvement (Brooks, 2004) and different governance strategies.10 So as 
to analyze the effect of port governance models on port traffic competition, we based on 
three different viewpoints: regulation, finance and ownership. 
First, few studies have evaluated regulation needs in relation to port traffic. According 
to Trujillo and Tovar (2012), competition is an economic factor that has an influence on 
port regulation, which in turn affects port traffic. Likewise, some studies have taken into 
account the effect of port pricing regulation. Thus, theoretical studies tend to associate 
investment in port capacity and hinterland congestion with port prices (De Borger et al., 
2008) and a shipping line’s choice of port (Bae et al., 2013). Whereas, the empirical analysis 
conducted by Fageda and Gonzalez-Aregall (2014) concluded that the strict regulation of 
port charges in Spain influenced the volume of port traffic and mitigated price competition. 
Secondly, an analysis of port finance systems11 shows that typically governments use 
public resources to subsidize basic port infrastructure. Yet, the growth of the private sector 
has led to a debate regarding the introduction of limits on port investments (World Bank, 
2007). However, no previous study has examined the relationship between port financial 
management and port traffic. To our knowledge, only the study of Castillo-Manzano et al. 
(2010) provide evidence about the positive effect on port traffic of the successive reforms 
in Spain that have given more autonomy to port authorities in the management and 
organization of their activities.  
Finally, more studies can be found on the effects of privatization on port efficiency. 
Privatization may have a positive effect on port efficiency, technical progress and national 
welfare (Cheon et al, 2010; Cullinane et al., 2002; Czerny et al., 2014). However, Tongzon 
and Heng (2005) conclude that the best option for port efficiency is to limit private sector 
participation and Liu (1995) do not find differences between public and private British 
ports. However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have analyzed the 
relationship between port governance systems and port traffic. 
                                               
10 For a port governance model (Service Port, Tool Port, Landlord Port, Private Port) see World Bank (2007). 
11 For a detailed analysis of port finance systems see World Bank (2007). 
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Drawing on a number of research studies (the Espo Fact Finding Report, 2010; 
Verhoeven and Vanoutride, 2012; ISL report, 2006 and OECD Policy Round Tables, 2011; 
World Bank, 2007), with the goal of determining a simple homogeneous structure for 
Europe’s port system, we classify them in three categories: market, hybrid and 
bureaucratic.12 
The first category – market port systems – includes those port authorities with their 
own management body operated by a private firm, with its own financial resources and a 
regulatory framework based on free market prices. Port authorities with these 
characteristics can be found above all in the United Kingdom. 
The second category – hybrid port systems – includes all port authorities with an 
autonomous individual management run by the regional or local government. These port 
authorities may be recipients of public aid, including subsidies financing their 
infrastructure, while their regulatory framework is based on free market prices or regulation 
imposed by the local government. Examples of the hybrid port system can be found in 
Amsterdam, Antwerp and Rotterdam. 
The third category – bureaucratic port systems – includes port authorities with 
individual management run by the central government and public financial resources 
(public subsidies). These port authorities operate strict regulatory frameworks where prices 
are established by the central government. Examples can be found in France, Spain and 













                                               
12 Espo Fact Finding Report (2010) and Verhoeven and Vanoutride (2012) classify port authorities in three 
regions: Hanse (North), Latin (South) and Anglo-Saxon (United Kingdom). They conclude that differences 
exist in terms of ownership and financial autonomy (port authorities being more limited in the south) and 
between small and large ports, with the latter presenting more transparent systems of management. 
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Figure 2. Map of the European port system classification 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on our port regulation and information from   
Containerization International Yearbook 2012 and annual reports of port authorities. 
 
As can be seen, the dominant port system in Southern Europe (grey color) is the 
bureaucratic model, characterized by a strict regulation and less price flexibility. In case that 
competition between ports spur traffic, we may expect that ports under this system absorb 
less traffic than ports located in Northern Europe (black color) dominated by the hybrid 
model. Likewise, we expect greater traffic volumes in ports operating a market system (light 




3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In this section we develop an empirical model to estimate the factors that influenced 
container traffic in European ports during 2010. First, we consider a number of control 
factors, including, the economic and geographic attributes of the region in which the port 
authorities are located. Second, we consider such port attributes as the share of 
transshipment traffic, competition within terminals and the volume of traffic at 
neighboring ports. Third, we include variables related to surface transportation modes. 
Finally, we take into account the different port governance models operated by the port 
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authorities. In short, these factors can affect port competition between other ports but also 
within the own port authority. 
We estimate a cross-sectional equation in which the dependent variable is the amount of 
container port traffic handled by the European port authority i during 2010. The equation 













Table 1 shows the variables used in the empirical analysis, the sources of information 
and the descriptive statistics. We group the variables into four categories: Economic and 
geographic attributes of the region, port attributes, surface transportation and port 
governance models. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
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0.25 0.43 0 1 
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Source: Own elaboration based on different sources of information.  
 
First, as economic and geographic attributes of the region, we include Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), location variables, and dummies for inland navigation channels and 
islands. The expected sign of the GDP variable is positive, since wealthier regions should 
generate more container traffic due to more demand from maritime transport services. In 
contrast, the expected sign for the location variables is unclear. On the one hand, the 
largest ports are located in the North-West of Europe but, on the other, ports located in 
the Mediterranean Sea (South-East) absorb part of the international trade that originates in 
Asia and passes through the Suez Canal. We also consider inland port authorities for which 
the expected sign is negative reflecting smaller regions and smaller local demand.13 Finally, 
the expected sign of the island variable is not clear as the traffic to these peripheral 
locations is captive so that it is totally dependent on the size of local demand.14 
Second, in the case of port attributes, we consider a dummy variable for ports that act as 
large hubs. Here, we include ports that can hold more than 2 million TEUs and which have 
a higher than 50% share of transshipment. The expected sign of the variable is positive 
since these ports should handle more traffic than is predicted by local demand. According 
to Heaver et al. (2000), shipping line alliances in hubs will have a greater presence and a 
greater market influence on the decision-making of port authorities in the future. 
We also consider a ‘no multiuser’ variable that takes a value of one in the case of those 
ports in which at least one terminal is managed and monopolized by a single shipping line. 
The expected sign of this variable is a priori unclear. On the one hand, such a scenario 
could weaken competition as one of the port’s terminals would be free from any 
competitive pressure; on the other, a positive sign might be expected as the shipping line 
would guarantee a certain volume of port traffic.  
To this point, the variables for hub ports and no multiuser terminal may work as a 
proxy for intra-port competition; intra-port competition should be more intense in those 
ports that are not a hub and those ports where all terminals are multiuser. However, even 
in these ports intra-port competition may be weak. Dong et al. (2016) find that terminals 
within a port may have strong incentives to collude in prices, while Van Reeven (2010) 
shows that intra-port competition (in a landlord port management model) is not in the 
interest of the port operators because it reduces their profits and prices for the customers. 
                                               
13 See table in the Annex for a list of all inland port authorities in our database. 




In addition, we consider a variable for the volume of traffic in neighboring ports, taking 
into account the number of nearby ports located in a radius of between one hundred and 
five hundred miles. We then sum the total amount of port traffic for each traffic threshold. 
The expected sign of this variable is a priori unclear. In the literature, Yap and Lam (2006) 
reported that port competition only benefits the largest seaports in East Asia that are 
located in the same hinterland. Likewise, Notteboom (2009), in a study of shipping-line 
decisions, observed a tendency towards concentration in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta region. In 
that case, the largest ports acted as substitutes for each other while smaller ports were 
complements of the large load centers. Hence, in our analysis, the sign should be negative 
if competition has a substitution effect between major ports in the same region. However, 
a positive sign might be expected if a complementary effect is dominant. Indeed, the traffic 
handled by the port could grow due to an increase in the total amount of traffic in the 
nearby ports as more shipping lines may include it in their routes. 
Plainly, transporting goods by inland requires an efficient network infrastructure. So, an 
increase in corridor capacity increases a port’s output and profit and reduces the profit of a 
rival port (Zhang, 2008). Thus, De Langen (2008) stressed the importance of the port 
authority as a coordinator capable of enhancing the efficiency of the transport chain and 
competitive clusters. So as to measure the effect of surface transport modes, we also 
include explanatory variables related to the endowment of motorways in the country and 
the endowment of rail facilities within a terminal. In the first case, the endowment of 
motorways is measured at the country level that could distort our results but data at a more 
disaggregated level is not available. The expected sign for the motorway variable is unclear 
since, on the one hand, it might be positive as it could promote greater efficiency in the 
logistics chain (a complementary effect); yet, on the other hand, it might be negative with 
maritime traffic losing out to road traffic (substitution effect). Finally, the rail facilities 
variable is expected to present a positive sign since it should serve to attract more container 
traffic and to transport it to other regions.  
Finally, in the case of the models of port governance we consider three characteristics:  
regulation, finance and ownership. Specifically, we consider hybrid and bureaucratic system 
variables, where the reference variable is the market system. The expected sign of these 
variables is unclear, as there is a dearth of studies explicitly examining the influence of the 
models of governance on port traffic and so it is difficult to identify a clear relationship 
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between the two.  However, we can expect a positive sign of the hybrid model variable as 
the more intense competition that allows the free pricing could allow attracting more 
traffic. In contrast, the bureaucratic variable model is expected to have a negative sign as it 
put barriers to competition between ports of the same country subjected to this 
governance model.  
 
4.  ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
In this section we show the results of the estimation of the port traffic equation 
considering various econometric techniques. As we mention above, a limitation of our data 
is that they refer to just one year. Having said that, several explanatory variables are time 
invariant (longitude, latitude, inland, island, hub) or have a very low variability over time 
(no_multiuser, motorways, railfacility, hybrid, bureaucracy). Hence, the added value of a 
panel dataset (repeated cross-sections over time) for these variables should be modest. 
Only the variables of port traffic and GDP may be affected by relevant important changes 
from one year to the other. Note here that the GDP variable is just a control factor, while 
we must be cautious in the interpretation of results of the traffic of nearby ports variable.  
An initial analysis of the distribution of the dependent variable (Figure 3) shows a range 
of values from extreme to values close to zero, indicating that it is severely positively 
skewed with a non-normal distribution. A log normalization of the dependent variable was 
therefore conducted to reduce the skewness (see Figure 4). Note also the importance of 
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Source:  Total of container traffic of 92 European port authorities and based on information obtained from 
Containerization International Yearbook 2012. 
 
The resulting model of log normality of the dependent variable appeared to resemble 
the basic normal distribution, indicating the possibility of estimating an OLS model. 
However, as Table 2 shows, the Doornik-Hansen test for multivariate normality and the 
skewness and kurtosis normality test showed that the log-transformed dependent variable 
continued to follow a non-normal distribution. 
Table 2. Econometric normality tests and summary statistics 
 Results of tests 
N 92 
Mean 12.723 
Standard Deviation 1.287 
Skewness and kurtosis normality test  
(dependent variable) 
71.28*** 
Skewness and kurtosis normality test  
(log transformation dependent variable) 
6.30** 
Doornik Hansen test for multivariate normality 2931.008*** 
         Note 1: Standard errors in brackets. 
          Note 2: Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Several studies in the fields of insurance, health and transportation (Manning and 
Mullhay, 2001; de Jong and Heller, 2008; Hill and Miller, 2010 and Tyworth and Zeng, 
1998) have used dependent variables with a positively skewed distribution. These analyses 
indicate, however, that distributional problems can occur, resulting in substantial bias in the 
OLS regression. We, therefore, considered different classes of regression models based on 
the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) in which the log-link function could be implemented 
without imposing a transformation of the dependent variable. In addition, our estimations 
may present a problem of heteroscedasticity in the error term. To correct this, we applied 
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robust standard errors in all our analyses. Indeed, Cameron and Trivedi (2009) recommend 
using robust standard errors for parameter estimates in some count-data models. 
An alternative to the OLS regression is a Poisson model. Statistical theory considers that 
in a Poisson distribution the conditional variance is equal to the conditional mean. In order 
to determine whether our model satisfied this assumption, we calculated the Pearson 
dispersion statistic. This goodness-of-fit test is defined as the Pearson statistic divided by 
the model’s degrees of freedom (DF) which should give a value of around one (Hilbe, 
2007).  A result greater than one, however, might indicate over-dispersion, while a result 
lower than one would indicate under-dispersion. Such a situation could lead to the 
incorrect estimation of the standard errors. In our case, the ratio of the Pearson statistic to 
the DF was equal to 1062245, clearly indicative of an over-dispersion problem, and as a 
consequence, the Poisson distribution is not a good choice in our estimation process. 
Given the problem of over-dispersion, we had to consider alternative models. 
Alternatives include a negative binomial distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Hilbe, 
2007) or a gamma distribution model. In the first case, the ratio of the Pearson statistic to 
the DF was equal to 1.02, i.e., almost 1, close to the goodness-of-fit statistic. In the second 
case, the ratio of the Pearson statistic to the DF is also equal to 1.02, i.e., almost 1, close to 
the goodness-of-fit statistic too. 
The gamma distribution assumes that the standard deviation is proportional to the mean 
and can be used when the dependent variable is continuous and does not present a normal 
distribution. In our analysis, the dependent variable presents positive integer values but the 
number of counts is so high that it resembles a continuous variable. Consequently, the 
gamma distribution is a better alternative than the negative binomial model. 
Moreover, we need to consider the possibility that some endogenous explanatory 
variables might bias the estimation results. In particular, there may be a simultaneous 
determination of traffic and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), so that the GDP variable 
may be endogenous; thus, in our estimation we considered the lag of GDP variable as 
explanatory variable as it is hard to assume that the GDP in 2009 is dependent upon traffic 
in 2010. Note that the use of additional lags of the GDP variable does not change the 
results of the empirical analysis 
Finally, we need to take into account the potential problem of multicollinearity due to 
the high correlation between the explanatory variables. Table 3 shows that the results of 
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the variance inflation factor are lower than 4 in the equation considered, so we can 
conclude that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
Table 3: Variance inflation factor  
 VIF 
Log Traffic 1.66 









Rail facility 1.57 
Hybrid 2.94 
Bureaucracy 3.90 
MEAN VIF 1.91 
 
We estimated the GLM with a gamma distribution for different distances of nearby 
ports in order to select which is most appropriate for our analysis.15 In order to select one 
nearby port distance threshold as explanatory variable, we used different information 
criteria using goodness-of-fit statistics. Generally, there are two standard measures for a 
selection test for different estimations, namely, Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC), where a smaller AIC and BIC are preferred 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). However, and according to Hilbe (2007), most statisticians 
today prefer to use the AIC, BIC, or other model-specific fit statistics to the deviance. For 
this reason, we do not consider deviance goodness-of-fit statistics here. As a result, in the 
gamma distribution model using all thresholds for nearby port distances, the variable of 
port traffic in a 400-mile radius presents the lowest AIC and BIC values and so we have 
opted to consider this distance threshold in our preferred regressions. In any case, only the 
GDP and traffic in the nearby port variables are affected by the consideration of one or 
other of the measures of traffic handled in nearby ports. 
                                               
15 The details of the gamma distribution model using all thresholds for nearby port distances are available 
from the authors. 
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Table 4 reports the results of the equation of traffic in European ports using three 
estimation methods. The first column shows the results for the OLS regression, while the 
second and third columns show the results for the GLM using a negative binomial 
distribution and a gamma distribution, respectively. As can be observed, the estimation 
results when using the negative binomial and the gamma distribution techniques do not 
change. Recall that the results obtained with these two techniques should be more accurate 
in our context than those obtained with OLS. In any case, the result in table 4 suggests that 
the estimation is less precise when using OSL as some variables loss statistical significance 
when using this method. 



































































































Number observations 86 86 86 
R2 0.401 - - 
Joint significance test 8.597 - - 
AIC - 28.73 28.73 
BIC - -246.4 -246.4 
Pearson /DF - 1.044 1.044 
  Note 1: Robust Standard errors in brackets. 
  Note 2: Statistical significance at 1 %(***), 5 %(**), 10% (*) 
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Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of the traffic equation using the GLM with a 
gamma distribution. As mentioned above, although the results of the negative binomial and 
gamma distribution are similar, we opted to use the gamma distribution as our preferred 
method because our dependent variable resembles a continuous variable. The first column 
shows the results when considering the geographic attributes, the second when adding port 
competition variables, the third when adding surface transportation variables, and the 
fourth when considering all explanatory variables. 






















































































Hybrid - - - 
-0.455 
(0.410) 












Number observations 91 91 86 86 
AIC 29.41 28.70 28.71 28.73 
BIC -221.9 -278.9 -253.3 -246.4 
         Note 1: Robust standard errors in brackets. 
         Note 2: Statistical significance at 1 %(***), 5 %(**), 10% (*)     
 
Note that because of a lack of data for some explanatory variables, our sample is 
reduced from 91 to 86 observations. The following conclusions can be drawn from the 
results of our regressions. 
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The coefficient associated with the GDP variable (column 1) is positive and not 
statistically significant (although it is statistically significant when the construction of the 
variable capturing the traffic in nearby ports is calculated at the 100-, 200- and 300-mile 
radius). Thus, it would seem that the economic activity of the region in which the port 
authority is located may have a positive influence on container traffic, although the effect is 
not strong from a statistical point of view. A possible explanation of this result is that the 
hinterland of the port extends beyond the local region in which the port is located. 
In the case of the location variables, the coefficient associated with the longitude 
variable is negative but not statistically significant, while the coefficient associated with the 
latitude variable is positive and not statically significant. This seems to indicate that ports 
located in the North-West have more traffic. The island coefficient is also negative and 
does not reach statistically significant levels. This result can be explained by the peripheral 
characteristics of these ports, which means the existence of a large captive traffic making 
the ports totally dependent on local demand. Finally, the coefficient associated with the 
inland port variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that ports located in a 
navigable channel manage lower volumes of container traffic given that their traffic is 
related exclusively to their (small) local hinterlands. 
If we only consider a region’s economic and geographic attributes, almost all the 
variables are not statistically significant. This means it is essential to include additional 
variables to explain the determinants of port traffic. 
The coefficient associated with the number of ports located within a 400-mile radius 
(column 2), when also controlling for economic and geographic attributes, is positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, we find evidence of a complementary effect whereby the 
traffic handled by a port might grow due to an increase in traffic in a nearby port. This can 
be explained by the strategies adopted by shipping lines that operate regular lines and 
which stop at several ports that are located close to each other. 
Importantly, the coefficient of the large hub port variable is also positive and statistically 
significant. This, as discussed, can be attributed to the fact that ports with a greater share of 
transshipment traffic are able to generate more traffic than is otherwise predicted by their 
regional attributes. This result is in line with that obtained for the variable of the ‘no 
multiuser’ terminal. The coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant. 
Thus, a terminal managed by a shipping line company would seem to guarantee the 
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movement of more container traffic given the values of the other control variables. Here, it 
may be the case that intra-port competition in cases where there are more opportunities for 
that (non-hub ports, port with all terminals as multiuser) is weak in practice. It may be also 
the case that all terminal operators within a port share common resources and common 
bottlenecks which is what it essentially drives the aggregate amount of traffic that a port is 
able to generate.   
The above results do not change significantly when considering the surface 
transportation variables (column 3), while continuing to control for the economic and 
geographic variables and the port attributes. Only the coefficient associated with the 
latitude variable becomes negative and statistically significant. Thus, the coefficient 
associated with the endowment of motorways is negative but not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the complementary effect between ports and motorways is offset by the 
substitution effect, with the greater volume of freight transport by road reducing port 
traffic. Note here that according to Eurostat, in 2012 the percentage of inland freight 
transport by road in Europe was 75.1%, compared to 18.2% by rail and 6.7% by inland 
waterways (Eurostat, 2012. Units: % of total inland tkm). In contrast, the coefficient 
associated with the rail facility variable is positive and statistically significant. This means 
that if a railroad track is operated within the terminal (being able to move trains with more 
than 700 meters of length), this intermodal infrastructure may help the port to attract more 
traffic. 
Finally, when controlling for all the above explanatory variables, the coefficient 
associated with the hybrid variable is negative and not significant, while the coefficient 
associated with the bureaucratic variable is negative and statistically significant (column 4). 
Thus, we find evidence that ports with fixed-price regulation, central government 
ownership and public finance, negatively affect the attraction of port traffic. Consequently, 
a more market-oriented governance model seems to be positive for port traffic. As such, 
we would expect ports located in the North to have more competitive advantages than the 
ports located in the South that are subject to a bureaucratic system of port governance. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Competition between European port authorities can be associated with the effects of 
distant large transshipment ports as well as with local nearby ports. A more competitive 
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scenario can increase a port’s traffic due to incentives to be more efficient; yet, at the same 
time, this competition might also reduce the volume of traffic handled by less efficient 
ports. Here, controlling for several factors, we have examined whether ports benefit from a 
more competitive scenario. 
Overall, we can infer from our results that competition between ports may boost traffic. 
Indeed, ports may benefit from being located near to other large ports and from a more 
market-oriented governance model. In contrast, we do not find clear evidence that 
competition within the port spur traffic. Controlling for other factors, hub ports are able to 
generate more traffic. Hub ports are typically subject to an intense rivalry with other ports 
but they tend to be dominated by one shipping line. In this regard, traffic tends to be 
higher in ports that have a terminal managed by a shipping line. Finally, we also find that 
the connectivity with rail facilities is a major determinant of the ability of a port to attract 
traffic.  
As such, our results indicate that Southern European port authorities present specific 
characteristics that may undermine their competitive position. The Mediterranean port 
authorities are generally managed in accordance with the bureaucratic model of governance 
and operate few rail facilities within the port terminals. Although Mediterranean ports 
enjoy global connectivity in international shipping networks, it is difficult for them to 
extend their rail services in their own hinterlands (Notteboom, 2010). The OECD (2008) 
also observes an imbalance in geographical traffic flows between the North and South and 
concludes that the Northern region is likely to enjoy greater growth due to better 
hinterland transport conditions.  
In conclusion, Southern European port authorities need to consider adopting more 
flexible systems of governance in order to attract more traffic and to ensure greater 
efficiency. Furthermore, they should also consider the possibility of experimenting with 
different port governance models within the same region. In this way, the largest ports 
could be managed with more flexible systems so that they can increase their financial 
resources and invest in the port authority’s facilities, including better railway links. 
Likewise, ports in Southern Europe should be not so concerned by nearby ports and they 




A limitation of this analysis has been the lack of data preventing us from extending the 
analysis beyond a period of one year. Further research could usefully examine the influence 
of additional factors including the economic crisis or situations of over-investment. 
Similarly, future studies should examine in greater depth the dynamic relationship between 
competition, efficiency and traffic. 
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traffic tax funds PA'sproperty market bureaucracy hybrid 
More than 5 
Rotterdam NL 11145804 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Antwerp BE 8468475 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Hamburg DE 7900000 free external municipality 0 0 1 
From 3 to 5 
Bremen/Bremerhaven DE 4871297 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Valencia ES 4206937 law external state 0 1 0 
Felixtowe UK 3400000 free own private 1 0 0 
From 1 to 3 
GioiaTauro IT 2851261 law external state 0 1 0 
Algeciras ES 2810242 law external state 0 1 0 
Zeebrugge BE 2389879 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Marsaxlokk MT 2370729 law external state 0 1 0 
Le Havre FR 2358077 law external state 0 1 0 
Barcelona ES 1945735 law external state 0 1 0 
Genoa IT 1758858 law external state 0 1 0 
Southampton UK 1540000 free own private 1 0 0 
La Spezia IT 1285455 law external state 0 1 0 
Duisburg DE 1181000 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Las Palmas ES 1113262 law external state 0 1 0 
From 0.5 to 1 
Marseilles FR 953435 law external state 0 1 0 
Gothenburg SE 796000 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Liverpool UK 681414 free own private 1 0 0 
Leghorn IT 635270 law external state 0 1 0 
Bordeaux FR 632407 law external state 0 1 0 
Taranto IT 581936 law external state 0 1 0 
Cagliari IT 576092 law external state 0 1 0 
Constrantza RO 556694 law external state 0 1 0 
Dublin IE 554260 law external state 0 1 0 
Naples IT 532432 law external state 0 1 0 
Bilbao ES 531457 law external state 0 1 0 
Pireaus EL 513319 law own state 0 1 0 
Lisbon PT 512789 law external state 0 1 0 
Gdansk PL 508587 law external municipality 0 1 0 
Less than 0.5  
Leixoes PT 481784 law external state 0 1 0 
Gdynia PL 480142 law external municipality 0 1 0 
Koper SI 476731 law external state 0 1 0 
Teesport UK 469096 free own private 1 0 0 
Aarhus DK 447000 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Helsinki FI 399903 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Kotka FI 397286 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Venice IT 393913 law external state 0 1 0 
Sines PT 382089 law external state 0 1 0 
Strasbourg FR 360938 law external state 0 1 0 
Tenerife ES 357472 law external state 0 1 0 
Limassol CY 348861 law external state 0 1 0 
Paris FR 345000 law external state 0 1 0 
Helsingborg SE 320000 free own state 1 0 0 
Vienna AT 318000 free own private 1 0 0 
Malaga ES 298401 law external state 0 1 0 
Klaipeda LT 294954 law external state 0 1 0 
Trieste IT 281689 law external state 0 1 0 
Salerno IT 274940 law external state 0 1 0 
Thessaloniki EL 273282 law own state 0 1 0 
Tarragona ES 255407 law external state 0 1 0 
Riga LV 182980 law external state 0 1 0 
Savona IT 220000 law external state 0 1 0 
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Belfast UK 217896 free own private 1 0 0 
Grangemouth UK 215783 free own private 1 0 0 
Vigo ES 213123 law external state 0 1 0 
Oslo NO 201893 law external municipality 0 0 1 
Dunkirk FR 200858 law external state 0 1 0 
Ravenna IT 183041 law external state 0 1 0 
Rauma FI 166460 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Nantes FR 166266 law external state 0 1 0 
Copenhagen-Malmo DK 153000 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Seville ES 152612 law external state 0 1 0 
Tallinn EE 151969 law external municipality 0 1 0 
Gavle SE 147998 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Cork IE 147534 law external state 0 1 0 
Alicante ES 147308 law external state 0 1 0 
Rijeka HR 137048 law external state 0 1 0 
Mannheim DE 120568 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Varna BG 118702 law external state 0 1 0 
Hamina FI 115388 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Ancona IT 110395 law external state 0 1 0 
Cadiz ES 109187 law external state 0 1 0 
Castellon de la Plana ES 103956 law external state 0 1 0 
Ghent BE 102128 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Rouen FR 101328 law external state 0 1 0 
Bergen NO 93238 law external municipality 0 0 1 
Ludwigshafen DE 84762 free external state 0 0 1 
Lubeck DE 83939 free external municipality 0 0 1 
Bristol UK 80000 free own private 1 0 0 
Valletta MT 79936 law external state 0 1 0 
Waterford IE 71084 law external state 0 1 0 
Cartagena ES 64657 law external state 0 1 0 
Amsterdam NL 60043 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Tyne UK 57950 free own private 1 0 0 
Szczecin-Swinoujscie PL 56503 law external state 0 1 0 
Fredericia DK 55000 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Palma de Mallorca ES 54811 law external state 0 1 0 
Aalborg DK 54147 free own municipality 0 0 1 
Marin ES 48685 law external state 0 1 0 
Civitavecchia IT 41500 law external state 0 1 0 
  
